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Profit Maximising Rigid Prices and Vertical Integration 
 
Abstract 
This article explores profit maximising rigid pricing for a price setting firm and relates the 
results to vertical integration, which is an important area of corporate strategy and antitrust 
policy. The setting of a profit maximising rigid price is investigated in the face of a known 
distribution of short-run demand levels as a compromise between the flexible prices that 
would be appropriate in the short run at different levels of demand. The price and level of 
capacity are therefore set to maximise expected profits across varying levels of demand. With 
the help of computer simulations, it is shown that price rigidity increases the incentives for 
vertical integration particularly where upstream production is capital intensive, due to the 
increased importance of rationing. The incentives will also be particularly strong for more 
efficient and more capital intensive downstream production with low short-run marginal 
costs. 
Keywords: price rigidity, vertical integration, restraints, rationing, capacity. 
JEL: L10, L23, D42, D45 
 
Introduction 
This article explores profit maximising rigid pricing for a price setting firm and relates the 
results to vertical integration. It will be shown that the capacity cost level has a key influence 
on the setting of a rigid price relative to the related profit maximising flexible price levels. 
This then determines the frequencies and severities of periods of rationing of supply relative 
to periods of excess supply. While purchasing from an upstream supplier allows the pooling 
of demand uncertainties (Carlton, 1979: 199), and hence a reduced level of upstream 
capacity, in periods of rationing firms with high marginal values of the intermediate product 
can be left short of supply. 
Vertical integration and vertical relationships between firms are a key area of firm strategy 
and of antitrust policy. Many supply chains have been transformed in recent times by 
globalisation and modern information and transportation technologies, with some becoming 
increasingly ‘fine sliced’, pointing to a need for further research in this area.  There are 
various established theories of vertical integration (Casson, 1984). Among them is the idea 
that it can result from demand variability where prices are subject to short-run rigidity. This 
results in downstream firms being subjected to rationing and upstream firms bearing costs of 
unused capacity or unsold production. Perhaps the best-known explanation for price rigidity 
is that of menu costs, though there are also various other theories (Blinder et al., 1998). 
Both supply assurance and demand assurance have been shown to be important motives for 
vertical integration. For instance, shortages of supply led the Ford Motor Company to engage 
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in fairly extensive vertical integration by the 1920s (The Economist, 2009). In a study of the 
automobile industry, White (1971) found that supply risks motivate vertical integration. 
However, some modern motor manufacturers, such as Toyota, instead have close 
relationships with suppliers. Chandler (1976: 287-290) claimed that, with the rise of mass 
manufacturing, problems of ensuring adequate demand and supplies in capital intensive 
industries led to large costs of underutilised capacity to which firms responded by vertically 
integrating. In order to achieve more stable demand, a manufacturer may forward integrate 
into distribution or be linked to distributors by vertical relationships such as franchising 
contracts. A more recent study surveyed 150 senior executives and found that supply 
assurance measures, including forming long-term relationships with key suppliers, were 
considered key to flexibility by 72% of respondents (CSCMP’s Supply Chain Quarterly, 
2011).  Some industries face significant demand variability combined with high capacity 
costs while the value and rapid obsolescence of products can make inventory holding 
expensive (Wu et al., 2005: 126-8). 
As vertical integration is significant in antitrust policy it is important that there is a good 
understanding of efficiency-based incentives for it. Vertical integration and some vertical 
restraints, such as exclusive dealing arrangements, may sometimes be at least partly aimed at 
addressing the costs of price rigidity. The frequency and severity of periods of rationing and 
of excess supply arising from price rigidity can be seen as a key part of the economic 
performance of firms and industries. 
Green (1986) showed that firms have an incentive to vertically integrate in order to avoid 
market rationing. In Green’s model, firms are competitive and demand in the intermediate 
product market is subject to stochastic variations in excess demand. The decision of how 
much of the non-durable intermediate product to produce has to be made before demand is 
known in each period. Prices in the model are fixed and exogenous.  Full vertical integration 
and full vertical disintegration are shown to be generally the only stable equilibria. 
Intermediate outcomes are inherently unstable. 
Carlton (1979), citing an earlier discussion paper version of Green, argued that the traditional 
assumption that prices change instantly to clear markets is mostly unrealistic and that this is 
important to the question of vertical integration, citing evidence on the importance of supply 
assurance to vertical integration from Chandler (1964: 37, 84). He considered the case of a 
competitive market with identical firms, a known distribution of demand variation, and a 
price that is rigid in respect of that variation. The upstream firms do not know the level of 
demand in advance of deciding how much to produce in each period. Any unsold output is 
discarded. Carlton reasoned that the price must be greater than marginal cost due to the need 
to allow for unsold production. He demonstrated that downstream firms can have an incentive 
to vertically integrate production for part of their demand, as each firm requires at least that 
part of its demand with greater certainty than for higher levels of demand. Note that partial 
vertical integration seems to be fairly common (Krzeminska et al., 2013).  
Carlton did not solve for the optimal price in his mathematical model.  However, he 
supplemented it with a diagrammatic analysis consisting of iso-utility and zero-profit curves 
4 
 
relating to the price and the probability of satisfaction (i.e. the probability of being able to 
supply a customer in any period). He reasoned that the zero-profit curve must be upward 
sloping as a higher probability of satisfaction requires a greater level of output and hence 
greater costs of unsold output and a higher price. Note that he assumed that upstream firms 
are frequented by customers based on the combination of the probability of satisfaction and 
the price. He also made the key assumption that each customer frequents only a single 
upstream firm per time period, rather than continuing to search if unable to gain supply from 
the first upstream firm approached. All upstream firms are driven by competition to offer the 
same level of utility to customers, based on the combination of price and probability of 
satisfaction. 
Hendrikse and Peters (1989) made a further contribution to this stream of research, following 
in the spirit of Green. Similar to Carlton, they found partial vertical integration to be an 
equilibrium outcome. However, they did so by different means, namely by assuming 
differing risk attitudes of market participants.  They also assumed that the price is fixed, 
following Green, and that it is equal to the lowest reservation price of buyers in the market. 
This article will address a gap in the literature in relation to the price of the intermediate 
product for the case of price-setting upstream firms with market power. Some of the relevant 
vertical integration literature takes the price as given, while Carlton provides a diagrammatic 
analysis of the price in a competitive market based on the assumption that each downstream 
firm only ever frequents a single supplier in each time period. Also, this article will focus on 
rationing of supply as a motive for vertical integration in addition to excess supply which was 
the focus of Carlton’s model. 
In the model presented below the price is determined endogenously and is that of a monopoly 
upstream firm, as the simplest case of a price-setting firm. It is, however, hoped that the 
results on price setting will prove relevant in non-monopoly cases in future research. The 
monopoly is assumed to charge a single price for all units sold. While this is essentially a 
simplifying assumption, the monopolist might not have good information over the 
efficiencies of the downstream firms with which to price discriminate and a resale market 
could come into existence. Also, discriminating against more capital intensive and efficient 
firms, based on short-run marginal values, would be unlikely to be an effective strategy as it 
could simply result in the relevant firms becoming more labour intensive and less efficient. 
Additionally, introducing a degree of competition in the upstream industry would in any case 
curtail or eliminate the ability to price discriminate.  The monopolist could instead form 
special relationships with a subset of firms. For instance, it could try to avert backward 
integration by some downstream firms by forming longer-term contracts which involve 
supply priority and additional capacity investments by both the upstream and downstream 
firms. However, such arrangements would amount to vertical quasi-integration. A single 
price is therefore assumed in the model as the simplest way of exploring the setting of rigid 
prices in the absence of vertical quasi-integration. The model assumes that in each period 
demand is observed before the decision over the level of production is made. Therefore, if 
demand is not high enough there is unused capacity rather than unsold production.  
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Demand variability is also part of transaction cost theory. However, transaction cost theory 
could be argued to be less relevant in situations where demand variations for an intermediate 
product have a known distribution. Unexpected shifts in the distribution might be more likely 
to result in problems of opportunistic haggling due to the need to revise the terms of contracts 
between upstream and downstream firms. However, transaction cost theory could help to 
explain the nature of the contract used in a vertical relationship and why vertical integration 
might sometimes be preferred to vertical quasi-integration. 
Peak-load pricing is a further body of literature that concerns pricing and rationing with 
demand variability (Carlton, 1977; Crew et at., 1995). However, it deals with social welfare 
maximising pricing rather than profit maximising pricing which is of concern here. 
Note that the more general literature on rigid prices focuses its attention on why a price may 
by rigid (or ‘sticky’) and on testing for rigidity rather than on the level at which a rigid price 
will be set. Some literature has also explicitly modelled price inertia. For instance, Taylor 
(1980) assumed that prices are set according to competitor prices and the level of excess 
demand. However, the pricing studied in this article is not that of a process of readjustment 
towards a conventional equilibrium level. Instead the price represents a compromise made to 
maximise profits over varying levels of demand. 
The Model 
It is assumed that an upstream firm sets a long-run equilibrium price and capacity level. 
Assume, for simplicity, that the firm is a monopoly. It is further assumed that the firm’s price 
is fixed in the face of short-run fluctuations in demand, as each shock is relatively short-lived. 
Each shock lasts for a single period and the resulting demand variations have a known 
distribution. Therefore, the equilibrium price and capacity levels reflect the distribution of the 
short-run variations. Assume that output either cannot be stored between periods or that it is 
too expensive to do so. However, the effects explored in the model will still have force so 
long as the stock mechanism is costly to use. 
Assume that the downstream firms are competitive price takers. Because the downstream 
firms are price takers, there is no issue of double marginalisation, or of two-part tariffs 
resulting from it, in the model. However, assume that the downstream firms vary in their cost 
functions. This will be of significance in terms of the marginal values that the downstream 
firms place on supplies of the intermediate product. Assume also that they differ in terms of 
their distributions of quantities demanded across different time periods, as will be enlarged on 
below.  
Consider first the upstream firm’s choice of its capacity level, Qcap. Assume that the firm 
decides how much to produce at the beginning of each time period after the level of demand 
in that period has become known. The cost of each unit of capacity per period is constant at 
ccap. The marginal cost of producing a unit of output using an available unit of capacity is the 
constant value cprod. The price is P (P>cprod+ccap). It is assumed that this is the only price 
charged for all units sold and that there is no fixed-fee component of the pricing structure. 
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It is useful to assume that demand has a symmetrical triangular distribution. This is intended 
to be representative of what might be seen as more realistic distributions, in as much as the 
density has a peak and tails, and has the advantages that it is amenable to the mathematics 
that follows and that negative values can be fully excluded. The use of a triangular 
distribution would also facilitate the investigation of the effects of skewness in future 
research. 
The quantity demanded is qt=q(P, st), which is assumed to be continuous and strictly 
decreasing in P, where st is the shock to demand in time period t. This is a derived demand 
and reflects the fact that the downstream firms are price takers in both the intermediate 
market and the market for their output. It is assumed that rationing of consumers is always 
due to lack of upstream rather than downstream capacity. Assume that demand pooling 
efficiencies mean that upstream capacity is always less than total downstream capacity, as 
will be explored later, and that a consumer who cannot be served by one downstream firm in 
any time period can continue search for supply across other firms. 
For any given price, the quantity demanded is distributed between a maximum level of qmax 
=qmax(P) and a minimum of qmin =qmin(P). The mean of the distribution is denoted ?̅?= (qmin+ 
qmax)/2. The probability distribution function for the quantity demanded is F(qt, P): 
𝐹(𝑞𝑡, 𝑃) = 2 (
𝑞𝑡−𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛
)
2
, where 𝑞𝑡 ≤ ?̅?      (1.1) 
𝐹(𝑞𝑡, 𝑃) = 1 − 2 (
𝑞𝑡−𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛
)
2
, otherwise      (1.2) 
The distribution is further illustrated in Figure 1.  
[Figure 1 near here] 
Expected profits are composed of expected revenues net of the short-run production costs for 
periods when demand is at or below capacity, plus those for periods when it exceeds 
capacity, less the total cost of capacity: 
𝐸(𝜋) = (∫ 𝑓(
𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑞𝑡, 𝑃)𝑞𝑡𝑑𝑞𝑡 + (1 − 𝐹(𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝, 𝑃)) 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝) (𝑃 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) − 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝 
           (2) 
Maximising expected profits involves maximising with respect to both price and capacity. 
The profit maximising price will be considered later. The simplest way of solving for the 
profit maximising level of capacity, in terms of the price, is by setting the marginal expected 
benefit of capacity per period (MEBcap) equal to the marginal cost of capacity per period
i. 
MEBcap is the product of the probability that demand is at least as great as 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 multiplied by 
the margin of the price over the short-run marginal cost of production: 
𝑀𝐸𝐵𝑐𝑎𝑝 = (1 − 𝐹(𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝, 𝑃)) (𝑃 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑)      (3) 
Setting this equal to the marginal cost of capacity, 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝, gives: 
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𝐹(𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝, 𝑃) = 1 −
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝
𝑃−𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
        (4) 
Solving for the capacity level, Qcap, for the assumed distribution gives: 
𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛 + (𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛)√
𝑃−𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝−𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
2(𝑃−𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑)
 , where 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 ≤ ?̅?   (5.1) 
𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 = 𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥 − (𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛)√
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝
2(𝑃−𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑)
 , otherwise    (5.2) 
The determination of the level of capacity involves a trade-off between the cost of capacity 
and the margin between the price and the marginal cost of production that determines how 
close the capacity level is either to the minimum or the maximum possible quantity 
demanded. A low cost of capacity relative to the mark-up means that the optimum level of 
capacity is close to qmax. A high cost of capacity relative to the mark-up means that the 
optimum level of capacity is close to qmin.  
It can also be seen that the condition 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 ≤ ?̅? is equivalent to: 
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝 ≥
1
2
(𝑃 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑)         (6) 
There is rationing of supply in time periods when the quantity demanded exceeds Qcap. The 
expected excess demand per period, E(Qration), is: 
𝐸(𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = ∫
4(𝑞𝑡−𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛)
(𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛)2
(𝑞𝑡 − 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝)𝑑𝑞𝑡 + ∫
4(𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑞𝑡)
(𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛)2
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛+𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥
2
(𝑞𝑡 − 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝)𝑑𝑞𝑡
𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛+𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥
2
𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
      , where 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 ≤ ?̅?   (7.1) 
𝐸(𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = ∫
4(𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑞𝑡)
(𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛)2
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
(𝑞𝑡 − 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝) , otherwise    (7.2) 
Reductions in Qcap within the probability distribution of qt increase expected rationing. 
Substituting for Qcap with the values given in equations 5.1 and 5.2 then gives: 
𝐸(𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = (𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛) (
1
2
− (1 −
𝑃−𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝−𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
3(𝑃−𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑)
) √
𝑃−𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝−𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
2(𝑃−𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑)
)  
, where 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 ≤ ?̅?   (8.1) 
𝐸(𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = (𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛)
1
3√2
(
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝
𝑃−𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
)
3
2
 , otherwise    (8.2) 
Expected rationing is increasing in the range of demand variation, in the cost per unit of 
capacity, and in the marginal cost of production. Also, a higher price, relative to the other 
factors, results in a lower expected quantity of rationing, assuming that a higher price does 
not lead to a greater range of demand variation.  
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The ratio of the expected quantity of rationing to the expected quantity demanded per time 
period, a measure of supply unreliability, is positively related to the proportionate level of 
demand variability, as well as the cost of capacity and the short-run marginal cost of 
production. 
The mark-up that results from market power is already well-recognised as being important in 
terms of double marginalisation, excessive substitution of the intermediate product in 
downstream production (Warren-Boulton, 1974), and a downstream firm having an incentive 
to backwardly integrate simply in order to avoid paying a high price. However, in existing 
literature it has not been clear how the mark-up relates to theories of vertical integration 
based on rigid pricing. It has been shown above that it leads to increased capacity and 
reduced levels of rationing for a given level of demand variability facing the upstream firm, a 
given unit cost of capacity, and a given price. However, it remains to be seen how the price is 
determined. This will be explored later. 
Now consider the incentive for a downstream firm to internalise production of the 
intermediate product. Assume that the firm takes current upstream supply conditions as 
given. Assume, for convenience, that the marginal value of the intermediate product for 
downstream firm i, vi, is constant for each unit of its demand and that it is equal to the price 
in the downstream market, pd, minus the short-run marginal cost of production (excluding the 
cost of purchasing the intermediate product), ci; 𝑣𝑖 = 𝑝𝑑 − 𝑐𝑖  .  
A U-shaped long-run average cost curve could have been assumed, which would help to 
explain why the industry is competitive, but it is a useful simplifying assumption to have a 
constant short-run unit cost. As the model involves a hard short-run capacity constraint, the 
conventional assumption of production rising in the short-run to the point where price equals 
short-run marginal cost is not relevant. It is, however, similar to a case where short-run 
marginal cost rises sharply beyond some point. 
Assume that competition in the downstream industry results in the downstream price being 
determined by the constant short-run marginal cost of labour intensive downstream firms 
(again excluding the cost of purchasing the intermediate product), 𝑐𝐿, and by the price of the 
intermediate product. However, some downstream firms are more efficient and more capital 
intensive. It is these more efficient and capital intensive firms that are of interest in the 
present context in terms of vertical integration, as will be seen. 
𝑝𝑑 = 𝑐𝐿 + 𝑃          (9) 
And so the marginal value of supplies to firm i, up to the point where it is itself at capacity or 
has satisfied the demand that it faces, depends on its production cost advantage over less 
efficient and more labour intensive firms: 
𝑣𝑖 = 𝑃 + 𝑐𝐿 − 𝑐𝑖         (10) 
Assume that, for any given level of market rationing of the intermediate product, firm i will 
face a given proportion, zi, of that rationing on average. Backward integration allows the firm 
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to escape rationing and leads it to adjust its capacity level. The change in the firm’s total cost 
of capacity if it vertically integrates is 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑝
′ (𝑄𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑝), where 𝑄𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑝 is its new capacity level. 
This includes both its cost of capacity for the intermediate product and the change in the cost 
of capacity for its downstream production. The latter is the result of the adjustment to the 
firm’s capacity level caused by integration. The incentives regarding capacity levels both 
before and after vertical integration are considered below.  
The expected value of the effect on sales of the adjustment in the firm’s capacity level 
following vertical integration is 𝐸𝑆𝑖
′ (𝑄𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑝). This depends on both the capacity adjustment 
and the frequency of use of each unit of capacity concerned, which depends on the 
probability distribution of demand facing the firm. The firm’s average level of output per 
period before vertical integration is 𝑞𝑖 and its constant short-run marginal cost of producing 
the intermediate product is ciI.  
The incentive for downstream firm i to internalise production of the intermediate product can 
then be represented by the following expression: 
(𝑧𝑖𝐸(𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) + 𝐸𝑆𝑖
′ (𝑄𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑝))(𝑣𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝐼) − 𝑞𝑖(𝑐𝑖𝐼 − 𝑃) − 𝑐𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑝
′ (𝑄𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑝)   (11) 
It would be possible to model a case where a downstream firm’s capacity is exactly matched 
to a fixed proportion of upstream capacity. The downstream firm would have a fixed 
proportionate market share and the demand faced by it would therefore vary according to 
overall downstream market demand variations. At times of rationing, the proportion of the 
available supply of the intermediate product allocated to the downstream firm would be equal 
to its fixed market share. In such circumstances, a fixed proportion of upstream capacity is 
effectively dedicated to the downstream firm.  
However, it is more realistic to assume instead that the demand faced by any downstream 
firm is affected by firm-level variations in demand in addition to those concerning overall 
market demand. This means that extra capacity continues to have a positive value to the 
downstream firm even after its capacity level exceeds that part of the upstream firm’s 
capacity available to it at times of rationing. So the downstream firm has an incentive to 
invest in some level of additional capacity. 
Assume a degree of randomness in the spreading of demand across different downstream 
firms. Some consumers regularly frequent the same firm whenever they want to buy. 
However, their loyalty does not extend to being willing to pay a higher price than that 
charged by other downstream firms, or at least not by more than an insignificant amount. 
Other consumers randomly select which downstream firm to visit for each purchase. 
Consumers continue to other firms if they have not already been offered available supply. 
Variations in each downstream firm’s demand for the intermediate product in each time 
period therefore reflect a combination of the effects of changes in overall downstream market 
demand, variations in how random visitors’ demand is spread across different firms, and 
variations in factors specific to the firm’s regular customers.  
Assume that the demand facing downstream firm i can be expressed as follows: 
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𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑞𝑡(1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡)         (12) 
In this expression 𝑒𝑖𝑡 represents the firm-level shock to the demand faced by firm i at time t, 
where ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑖 = 0. 𝑞𝑡 is overall market demand and 𝛼𝑖 represents the firm’s proportionate 
market share when 𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 0. For simplicity, assume that spillovers of demand from firms that 
have reached capacity are included in the 𝑒𝑖𝑡 variable. It is therefore necessary to treat 𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 
𝑞𝑡 as jointly distributed because such spillovers will be greater during periods of high 
industry-level demand. Spillovers provide some reduction in the impact of firm level shocks. 
Consider first firm i without vertical integration. Outside of times of rationing it will 
sometimes receive more demand than 𝛼𝑖𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 due to positive firm-specific demand shocks. 
Its marginal expected benefit of expanding capacity beyond 𝛼𝑖𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 is then: 
∫ ∫ 𝑓(𝑞𝑡, 𝑒𝑖𝑡)(𝑐𝐿 − 𝑐𝑖)𝑑
𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
𝑞𝑡
−1
𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
1+𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑞𝑡      (13) 
The lower limits of the integrals are such that 𝑞𝑖𝑡 > 𝛼𝑖𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝. The expression demonstrates that 
the presence of firm-level demand shocks creates an incentive to invest in additional capacity, 
over and above the level 𝛼𝑖𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝. There is therefore a resulting mismatch in capacity levels 
between the upstream and downstream firms. Some downstream firms will therefore have 
idle capacity at times of rationing of the intermediate product. Note that it can be seen in the 
expression that this pertains to the more efficient and capital intensive firms in the presence 
of significant firm-specific shocks. There is therefore a greater incentive for vertical 
integration in order to address idleness of capacity imposed by rationing where downstream 
production is relatively efficient and capital intensive. 
Now consider the vertically integrated firm i’s marginal expected benefit from investing in 
capacity beyond a given level, 𝑄𝑖, with its intermediate product capacity matched to its 
downstream production capacity. The limits of the inner integral are set such that 𝑞𝑖𝑡  > 𝑄𝑖.  
∫ ∫ 𝑓(𝑞𝑡 , 𝑒𝑖𝑡)(𝑃 + 𝑐𝐿 − 𝑐𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝐼)𝑑
𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑄𝑖
𝛼𝑖𝑞𝑡
−1
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑄𝑖
𝛼𝑖(1+𝑒𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑥)
𝑒𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑞𝑡     (14) 
Note that the downstream price, pd, has replaced the intermediate product price, P, in contrast 
to equation 5, but with P reintroduced in expanding pd as per equation 9. It is the marginal 
value of the intermediate product to the integrated firm that determines the level of capacity 
and this depends on its production cost advantage, 𝑐𝐿 − 𝑐𝑖. This supplements the incentives 
for more efficient firms to undertake vertical integration; increasing their capacity levels to 
take account of the freedom from rationing that vertical integration affords. 
These effects represent a different argument to that explored in Carlton’s (1979) model which 
demonstrated a motive for partial vertical integration relating to the firm’s high probability 
demand. This was based on the problem of excess supply; the probability of not being able to 
sell units of the intermediate product. Periods of excess demand in the intermediate product 
market will sometimes be more important than periods of excess supply in leading to either 
vertical integration or vertical quasi-integration.  
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The incentive to backwardly vertically integrate is reduced by pooling efficiencies relating to 
those parts of the downstream firm’s variability of demand that are not common to the market 
as a whole. Such variations are pooled across many downstream firms in the demand facing 
the upstream firm which is therefore left with the variation in demand for the market as a 
whole. However, the use of vertical quasi-integration maintains pooling efficiencies. 
Forward vertical integration by the upstream firm is another possibility. This could combine 
diversified demand sources with more efficient levels of capacity and supply reliability. 
However, it would also depend on the ability of the monopoly to operate efficiently in the 
downstream industry in which it may be in other ways disadvantaged, such as due to 
downstream diseconomies of scale. In some cases the monopoly might become a franchisor 
rather than engaging in fully-fledged vertical integration. 
There is the possibility of some other form of price structure being offered to at least a subset 
of downstream firms to help address the problem of inefficient allocations under rationing 
and to induce the upstream firm to increase its capacity for the sake of downstream firms with 
higher marginal values of the intermediate product. This is subject to the problem that, in any 
single time period, there is asymmetric information between the upstream firm and the 
downstream firms over the total quantity of demand faced by the upstream firm. This is due 
to demand faced by the downstream firms being partly determined in each time period by 
firm-specific shocks rather than industry-level demand alone. Therefore, in any single period, 
the downstream firms cannot be certain of the degree of supply priority that they are actually 
being given.  
One strategy would be to offer more reliable supply to the more efficient and capital intensive 
downstream firms as a way of preventing backward integration. However, to be fully 
effective, the fees charged to any particular downstream firm would need to depend on the 
distribution of that firm’s demand, in terms of both the mean value and the variability. It 
would also need to allow for different levels of downstream firms’ marginal values. There 
could therefore be significant bargaining issues involved in negotiating the level of a fixed 
fee, or some more complex arrangement. Such negotiations could be impeded by a danger for 
the downstream firms that in volunteering to pay more they declare themselves as having low 
production costs and so open themselves up to greater rent extraction by the monopolist.  
Such an arrangement, in relying on contracting that depends on an agreed degree of reliability 
of supply being delivered over an extended period of time in the face of a pattern of demand 
from the downstream firm that may or may not turn out to be as expected by either side when 
it was agreed, would require continuing relationships between the upstream and downstream 
firms and contractual safeguards to facilitate adaptation to changing underlying conditions 
which would amount to vertical quasi-integration. The need for such safeguards would be 
strengthened by the additional capacity investments needed. A formal example of such a 
relationship is a just-in-time supply contract. Such a contract, by its nature, has to exist for a 
significant period of time to be effective and so is a fairly large departure from the pure 
market.  
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We are therefore left with the following factors (in addition to differences in unit costs of 
depending on whether production is upstream or downstream) concerning the incentives for 
either vertical integration or vertical quasi-integration: 
1. It allows for the profitable expansion of both upstream and downstream capacity 
levels. Capacity can be set at a level that reflects downstream marginal value. Absent 
of vertical integration and quasi vertical integration, the upstream firm invests in a 
capacity level that instead reflects the price in the intermediate product market. For 
some downstream firms, marginal value may be much greater than price. Restricted 
upstream capacity then leads to lower levels of downstream capacity due to costs of 
rationing of the intermediated product. With vertical integration, upstream capacity is 
matched to downstream capacity and both are expanded.  
2. It gains the advantage of removing costs of idleness of downstream capacity, in 
periods of adequate downstream demand, that result from the downstream capacity 
level being greater than the upstream capacity level. The capacity mismatch happens 
where additional capacity investments are made downstream due to firm-specific 
variations in demand.  
3. It avoids the problem of some portion of rationed supplies of the intermediate product 
being allocated to firms with lower marginal values. 
4. Backward vertical integration sacrifices the advantages of pooling downstream firm-
specific variations in demand, though these can be retained if there is quasi-
integration instead. 
5. The frequency and severities of rationing help to determine the incentive to integrate 
and depend on the pricing of the upstream firm. The pricing and the resulting 
rationing will now be considered. 
The expected profit of the upstream firm can be re-expressed as: 
𝐸(𝜋) = 𝐸(𝑞𝑡 − 𝑄𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)(𝑃 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) − 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝     (15) 
Substituting the values given in equation 5 for Qcap and the values given in equation 7 for 
E(Qration) then gives: 
𝐸(𝜋) = 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑃 − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) + (𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛)
√2
3
(𝑃 − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑)
3
2
√𝑃 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
 
       , where 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 ≤ ?̅?  (16.1) 
 
𝐸(𝜋) = ?̅?(𝑃 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) + (𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥 − 𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛)
√2
3
𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝
3
2
√𝑃−𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
− 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥 
       , otherwise   (16.2) 
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Assume now that mean demand follows the equation ?̅? = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑃 and define r (r≤2) as the 
range of variation of quantity demanded as a proportion of the mean quantity demanded:  
𝑟 =
𝑞𝑚𝑎𝑥−𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑎−𝑏𝑃
          (17) 
It will help in understanding the profit maximising rigid price, P*, to compare it with prices 
that react with full flexibility to short-run conditions but with the same level of capacity, Qcap, 
imposed. Say that there is multiplicative uncertainty, where the shock to demand in an 
individual time period, t, is st (-r/2≤st≤r/2), and 𝑞𝑡 = (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑃𝑡)(1 + 𝑠𝑡). The assumption of 
multiplicative uncertainty, as opposed to additive uncertainty, means that any fluctuations in 
demand are themselves sensitive to the price. This form of uncertainty is therefore assumed 
on the grounds that it seems appropriate in the current context.  The profit maximising 
flexible price in cases where the resulting quantity demanded does not exceed capacity can be 
found by maximising the following short-run surplus: 
(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑃𝑡)(1+𝑠𝑡)(𝑃𝑡 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑)        (18) 
This gives the following flexible price: 
𝑃1𝑡 =
1
2𝑏
(𝑎 + 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑)        (19) 
This gives a quantity traded that is increasing in st: 
𝑞1𝑡 =
1
2
(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑)(1 + 𝑠𝑡)       (20) 
For higher values of st price is set to match the quantity demanded to the level of capacity, 
Qcap: 
(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑃2𝑡)(1 + 𝑠𝑡) = 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝        (21) 
This gives the following profit maximising flexible price: 
𝑃2𝑡 =
1
𝑏
(𝑎 −
𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
1+𝑠𝑡
)         (22) 
Note that this price increases with st at a decreasing rate. The associated constant quantity 
traded is: 
𝑞2𝑡 = 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝          (23) 
The price Pt is set at P1t so long as the quantity demanded does not exceed Qcap which is the 
case when the following condition holds: 
𝑠𝑡 ≤
2𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
𝑎−𝑏𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
− 1         (24) 
Otherwise it is set at P2t. A price of P2t has the advantage compared to the rigid price, P
*, that 
it avoids rationing and so ensures that the output is allocated efficiently, with demand at that 
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price being fully satisfied. Also, P* is above P1t and so the rigid price is inefficiently high at 
lower levels of market demand, resulting in excess supply.  
 
Simulations 
Figure 2 was produced by brute-force enumeration, performed by a purpose-written computer 
programme, to establish the profit maximising value of the rigid price P* for many values of 
the range of demand variability, r. 
[Figure 2 near here] 
In Figure 2 increasing demand variability leads to an increase in the rigid price, 
compromising more strongly between the profit maximising flexible prices for lower and 
higher levels of demand, so that price rigidity imposes increasing inefficiencies on both the 
upstream and downstream firms. Capacity falls in this example, tending more towards qmin 
than qmax (see equation 5), and expected rationing increases. Expected profits fall. The 
capacity level becomes increasingly inefficient from the point of view of customers with a 
relatively high valuation of the product. The greater incidence of rationing also increases the 
losses incurred by higher-valuation downstream firms caused by the rationing mechanism 
failing to allocate available supplies efficiently. Increased demand variability therefore 
increases the incentives for vertical integration.  
Each graph in Figure 3 was produced by mathematically solving for one value of P1t and 
many values of P2t, while the value of P* was again found by brute force enumeration. The 
figure illustrates the fact that P* is a compromise price between the range of the flexible Pt 
prices. Rationing of supply occurs to the right of the point where Pt and P*are equal. To the 
left of this point there is excess supply in the form of idle capacity. In each graph, the severity 
of rationing or excess supply is increasing in the vertical distance between P* and Pt. In 
Figure 3b Pt is always equal to P2t. In Figures 3a and 3c it is equal to P1t to the left of the kink 
and equal to P2t to the right of the kink. The value of P1t is the same in all three graphs. 
It can be seen from the graphs in Figure 3 that the frequencies and severities of rationing and 
of excess supply vary substantially across the different cases. The rigid price does not simply 
even out periods of rationing and of excess supply. 
[Figure 3 near here] 
What factors determine the weighting of the value of the rigid price, P*, relative to the range 
of values of Pt? The height of the P2t prices above the P1t prices is a key factor, together with 
how early the point is reached where Pt=P2t. The P1t  prices equate short-run marginal cost to 
marginal revenue. Raising the rigid price a little above P1t therefore has a fairly small effect 
on the surpluses earned in time periods with the relevant values of st (i.e. left of the kink) 
because marginal revenue and marginal cost are still fairly close in value. However, the P2t 
prices are set at a higher level due to restricted capacity. Where, for a given value of st to the 
right of the kink, the P2t price is substantially above the P1t price then raising the rigid price 
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even a little above the P2t price has a much more significant effect on the surplus earned 
because marginal revenue is then significantly greater than marginal cost.  
Differentiating expression 18 with respect to 𝑃𝑡 gives (?̅? − 𝑏(𝑃𝑡 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑)) (1 + 𝑠𝑡), which is 
zero where Pt=P1t. This shows how the magnitude of the negative impact on the surplus 
generated in a time period where demand is below capacity is increasing in the excess of the 
current price over P1t. In the figure, this holds to the left of where the rigid price and the 
flexible prices cross.  
For instance, a lower level of capacity resulting from a higher unit cost of capacity causes P2t 
to become the relevant flexible price earlier into the range of Pt prices, as can be seen by 
comparing the different graphs in Figure 3. High costs of capacity therefore mean that the 
rate of loss of revenues involved in raising the value of the rigid price, P*, above values of P2t 
is high on average. This results in P* being set lower and so crossing Pt further to the left, so 
that rationing is more frequent and, on average, more severe than if P* were set higher. 
The variation in the effect of a rise in the rigid price on the surpluses earned in time periods 
when there is adequate capacity to supply the quantity demanded, in other words where the 
rigid price is at or above Pt, is in contrast to its fixed and unmitigated positive effect at times 
of rationing of supply. This is because, when there is rationing, the quantity sold remains 
fixed as the price is raised until the price reaches the point where rationing has been 
eliminated. So, in time periods where the value of st is to the right of the kink and the rigid 
price, P*, is below the flexible price P2t an increase in the rigid price to bring it closer to P2t, 
but without crossing above it, has a fixed effect for any given level of capacity.  
A further factor is that the weighting is partly determined by the differences in the levels of 
output concerned at the different values of st. The level of output is at capacity during periods 
of rationing and is increasing in st at other times. This helps to weight the rigid price towards 
higher levels relative to the range of Pt prices when P1t is the relevant flexible price over a 
significant part of the range of levels of demand, as determined by inequality 24; in other 
words, when the level of capacity is well into the range of possible levels of quantity 
demanded. A higher cost of capacity, lowering the level of capacity, results in P1t ceasing to 
be the relevant flexible price further to the left. Hence, a higher cost of capacity again results 
in a rigid price being weighted lower relative to the range of values of Pt, crossing Pt further 
to the left, resulting in more frequent and severe rationing.  
Note that the shape of the probability density is one factor that does systematically increase 
the weightings of flexible prices that are associated with values of st closer to zero. This is 
because of its central peak. The strength of this affect is therefore decreasing in the degree of 
spread of the distribution; in other words, with the degree of demand variability. 
Figure 3b represents a case with a higher cost of capacity than Figure 3a and hence a lower 
level of capacity. It can be seen that the price is weighted lower into the range of Pt prices. 
The point where P* is equal to Pt is therefore further to the left and so rationing is more 
frequent. Figure 3c further illustrates the same point, but with a lower cost of capacity so that 
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the price is weighted further to the right into the range of Pt prices and the frequency of 
rationing is lower.  
A higher unit cost of capacity in upstream production therefore leads to a price of the 
intermediate product that results in more frequent excess demand. Downstream firms face 
more frequent rationing that is more severe on average. This therefore increases incentives 
for either vertical integration or vertical quasi-integration in relation to more efficient and 
more capital intensive downstream production. 
This approach to examining the rigid price could be taken further by incorporating choices 
over backward vertical integration explicitly into the demand function. Rather than simply 
making the long-run demand function more elastic, this would involve explicitly 
incorporating the level of reliability of supply into it. The results would depend on the 
distribution of downstream firms’ preferences concerning the trade-off between the price 
level and the degree of supply reliability. This is something that the monopoly might not have 
good knowledge of and so its managers would then have to use their judgment to estimate the 
effects. It would also depend on the strength of the monopoly’s cost and product superiority 
advantages. Note that in more competitive industrial structures firms might have little choice 
but to set their prices low, in order to be able to sell at times of market excess supply, 
irrespective of longer-run implications for demand, except where they can form longer-run 
relationships with individual customers. Without such relationships, there could be a risk of a 
low price, high rationing industry outcome. Some relationships would then be of a deeper 
nature in order to further address the problems associated with rigid pricing. 
Conclusion 
The model and simulations explored profit maximising rigid pricing by an upstream price-
setting firm. It was argued that, while purchasing from the upstream firm results in 
efficiencies from the pooling of demand variations, at times of higher market demand 
downstream firms that have high marginal values for the intermediate product (due to 
efficiency and capital intensity) can find themselves subjected to rationing. Vertical 
integration results in the integrated firm ensuring that it can produce enough of the upstream 
product for itself to match its downstream capacity level. It also has an incentive to expand its 
overall capacity level. The advantages of vertical integration can alternatively be captured 
through quasi integration while still gaining pooling advantages. 
The focus is different to Carlton’s (1983) model which concentrates on excess supply and 
resulting costs of unsold production. His model relies on the insight that the market price of 
the intermediate product must exceed its constant marginal cost of production, as it must also 
cover the costs of unsold production, to demonstrate an incentive for vertical integration (p. 
197). It demonstrated a motivation for vertical integration based on high probability demand 
and excess supply rather than on excess demand. The current model is also in contrast to 
Green’s (1986: 180) model which treats the price as exogenous. Additionally, both Green and 
Carlton focussed on competitive upstream markets, whereas here the upstream firm has 
market power. 
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In the model, the profit maximising rigid price is a compromise between the flexible prices 
that would be appropriate in the short-run at different levels of demand. However, the price 
does not systematically even out periods of rationing and excess supply. Rather, the 
characteristics of the case concerned determine the frequencies and severities of rationing 
across different time periods. They can therefore produce more frequent rationing, more 
frequent excess supply, or an intermediate outcome. With the help of simulations, it was 
shown that a higher unit cost of capacity results in the upstream firm setting the rigid price so 
that rationing is more frequent and more severe on average. This keeps the upstream firm 
working more consistently close to full capacity. Where the upstream firm has a low unit cost 
of capacity the rigid price is set at a level that results in more frequent excess supply so that 
the firm can profit more from periods of high demand. These results were explained in 
relation to the range of quantities sold in different time periods when demand is within 
capacity, to the excess of marginal revenue over marginal cost where flexible prices are set to 
prevent the quantity demanded from exceeding capacity, and to the fixed effect on the surplus 
earned of a higher price in a period of rationing. 
A key implication of the model, therefore, is that price rigidity increases the incentives for 
vertical integration particularly where upstream production is capital intensive, due to the 
increased importance of rationing. The incentives will also be particularly strong for more 
efficient and more capital intensive downstream production with low short-run marginal 
costs. 
With rigid prices, the price mechanism is less effective than might be thought at allocating 
the output of a low capacity level (due to frequent rationing) and at keeping high capacity 
levels well-utilised (due to frequent excess supply). The upstream firm’s profits decline and 
its price rises as demand variability increases, with the rigid price being pushed further above 
the marginal cost of production. Both private performance and social efficiency therefore 
suffer as demand variability increases.  
The centrality of the cost of capacity in the model and of firm efficiency, combined with 
price-setting power, in generating incentives for vertical integration accords with empirical 
evidence showing that vertical integration is more common in capital intensive and more 
concentrated industries and among more productive firms (MacDonald, 1985; Hortaçsu and 
Syverson, 2007). The capital intensity of upstream firms is important in terms of their 
decisions over their capacity levels and prices. The capital intensity of downstream firms is 
important in terms of the costs to them of having their production processes disrupted by 
unavailable supplies. Vertical integration will sometimes be a necessary accompaniment to 
investment in more capital intensive downstream production. 
Considering more competitive upstream industries, an alternative to vertical integration is for 
the upstream and downstream firms to form relationships so that the access given to upstream 
firms’ capacities can be better matched to the needs of particular customers. Each firm could 
then serve a mix of higher and lower priority customers, so allowing for better capacity usage 
than when just selling to high priority customers. Some downstream firms might be willing to 
pay higher prices and to give consistent trade to a supplier in order to gain privileged access 
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to upstream capacity. On the other hand, a downstream firm might be given a lower price for 
guaranteeing some minimum level of demand in each period and then charged a fee for the 
guarantee of supplies to satisfy higher levels of demand. Others might choose instead to buy 
at low prices, incurring high costs of searching for available supplies across different 
suppliers when necessary, though at times being unsuccessful in their searches. Without 
relationships between firms, price competition might result in a low price, low industry 
capacity outcome. Such relationships would also be deepened in order to further address 
problems caused by price rigidity. 
The motives for vertical integration and for relevant vertical restraints that may result from 
relationships between firms have implications for antitrust policy towards vertical 
foreclosure. A firm that is vertically integrating or seeking prioritised supply from its 
suppliers and exclusive dealing or other arrangements such as dedicated retail floor space 
with transaction specific investments may be significantly foreclosing its competitors. 
However, the anticompetitive effects need to be weighed against the factors explored in this 
article; that there can be significant efficiency gains in terms of gaining more stable demand 
and more reliable supply. 
Further work could investigate the effects of alternative industry structures, such as the 
effects of competition in the upstream industry. It could also investigate the effects of 
endogenising variables treated as exogenous in the model in order to control its scope.  
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Figure 1: The symmetrical triangular distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
  
qmax qmin qt q  =(qmin+qmax)/2 
f(qt)=4(qt-qmin)/( qmax-qmin)2 
F(qt)=2((qt-qmin)/( qmax-qmin))2 
f(qt)=4(qmax-qt)/( qmax-qmin)2 
1-F(qt)=2((qt-qmax)/( qmax-qmin))2 
0 
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Figure 2: How price, capacity, expected rationing, and expected profit vary with 
demand variability (r) 
Figure 2a: Price 
 
Figure 2b: Capacity 
 
Figure 2c: Expected quantity of rationing 
 
Figure 2d: Expected profits 
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Figure 3: The rigid price, P*, as a compromise price 
Figure 3a: With parameter values as per figure 2 (ccap=30, r=1.1) 
 
Figure 3b: With a higher cost of capacity (ccap=50) 
 
Figure 3c: With a lower cost of capacity (ccap=10) 
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i  
∂𝐸(π)
∂𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
= (
∂
∂𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
( ∫ 𝑓(𝑞𝑡 , 𝑃)𝑞𝑡𝑑𝑞𝑡
𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
𝑞𝑚𝑖𝑛
) +
∂
∂𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝
((1 − 𝐹(𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝, 𝑃)) 𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝) (𝑃 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝 
= (𝑓(𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝, 𝑃)𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 − 𝑓(𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝, 𝑃)𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 + (1 − 𝐹(𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 , 𝑃)) (𝑃 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝  
=((1 − 𝐹(𝑄𝑐𝑎𝑝 , 𝑃)) (𝑃 − 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑) − 𝑐𝑐𝑎𝑝 
 
                                                             
